Freedom Within Causality: A Defence of Situated Agency in the Determinism and Compatibilism Debate

Abstract

The question of whether human beings possess ‘Free Will’ remains one of the most persistent and influential philosophical debates. Determinism asserts that all events, including human decisions, are the necessary consequences of prior conditions. Libertarian theories claim that humans possess the ability to originate actions independently of causal chains. Compatibilism attempts to reconcile these competing frameworks by redefining ‘Free Will’ in a manner that does not conflict with determinism. This paper builds upon compatibilist reasoning and interdisciplinary developments in embodied cognition, phenomenology, and neuroscience to propose a new conceptual model of autonomy. The core argument is that human beings cannot control the biological, environmental, and historical conditions they inherit or encounter, yet retain meaningful agency in how they interpret, evaluate, and respond to those conditions. The paper calls this capacity ‘Situated Agency’ and defines it as a layered form of autonomy grounded in reflection, embodied cognition, and reasons-responsiveness. Situated agency accounts for unconscious neural processes identified in empirical research while also preserving agency as described in phenomenological analyses of reflection and experiential ownership. The result is a synthesis in which human freedom remains coherent within a causally determined world.